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1944

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Southwest Pacific Area

RENO IV

Outline Plan
for
OPERATIONS OF THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
1944

6 March 1944

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RENO IV
OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
OPERATIONS OF THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF
THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

6 MARCH 1944

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RENO IV
OUTLINE PLAN
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OPERATIONS OF THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF
THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

6 March 1944

RENO IV

OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF
THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES.

1. CONCEPT.

a. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE.

- (1) Secure land, naval and air bases in the Southern PHILIPPINES from which to launch an attack upon LUZON with a view to an attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.
- (2) Isolate JAPAN from the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area.

b. TASKS.

Present

Advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as the VOGELKOP by airborne-waterborne operations.

Seize MINDANAO by airborne-waterborne operations and establish land, naval and air bases.

Eventual

By air and naval action, isolate JAPAN from the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area.

Seize LUZON, initiate V.L.R. bombing of JAPAN, and establish bases necessary to launch an attack against the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

c. ANALYSIS OF TASKS.

This outline plan embodies operations that follow the capture of MANUS ISLAND and KAVIENG with the concomitant isolation of RABAU. It is assumed that the forces of the CENTRAL PACIFIC, staging through the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS, with naval elements based upon facilities at MANUS ISLAND, will seize the PALAUS at the earliest practicable date, but not later than 10 September 1944, a date tentatively agreed upon at the PEARL HARBOR conference of 27 January 1944 prior to the advancement of the dates of the operations against ENIWETOK and MANUS ISLAND.

As contemplated in CCS 417/2, it anticipates the transfer of resources, particularly naval and amphibious means between the CENTRAL and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS.

Initial operations require advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA, a line that does not lend itself to an effective hostile

defense. This is followed by the seizure of MINDANAO, which is lightly held by the enemy with scattered and isolated garrisons and is covered by our own guerrilla forces who control the major portion and operate extensive intelligence and communication nets.

Our advantages lie in the weakness of the hostile positions at the point of penetration, and in potential superiority on the sea and in the air. On the necessary assumption that the enemy will maintain his strategic defense to the limit of his capabilities, our advantages must be fully utilized to deal him a succession of blows which will preclude recouping his naval and air forces after each defeat, and permit his destruction in detail.

The eventual tasks require subsequent operations to effect the severance of sea communications between JAPAN and the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area, and to reoccupy LUZON in order to institute VLR bombing of JAPAN and to prepare bases for an attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA COAST area.

d. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

(1) General

The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our land-based bomber line westward rapidly along the land masses of NEW GUINEA to the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS by a successive occupation of the minimum bases required. Airdromes are seized and implemented along the north coast of NEW GUINEA; hostile strength is by-passed wherever practicable to avoid costly and time-consuming operations; our flanks are protected essentially by air operations, and the necessary advanced naval bases are established under protection of land-based aviation in order to extend the range of naval action.

Destructive air attacks are employed to soften up and gain air superiority over hostile air bases endangering our next advance. Hostile naval forces and shipping are destroyed along our line of advance, preventing reinforcement or supply of enemy air and naval forces within range, and of objectives under attack. Ground forces are displaced forward by water and air, covered by naval and/or air forces, to seize and establish air bases in each successive objective. Air and naval forces are established, and the process repeated to successive objectives, neutralizing by air action or by air, land, and sea action, intermediate hostile installations which may be by-passed. The number of objectives is decreased and the length of bound extended by employing carriers to provide both close and general air support of landing operations.

(2) The operations divide into the following phases:
(See Annex 1)

Phase I Advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the HUMBOLDT BAY and the GEELVINK BAY areas the bases required for subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO. *Islandia*

Phase II Establish air forces in the ARAFURA SEA area for strate-

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gic bombing operations in the N.E.I. and general support of subsequent operations into the VOGELKOP and HALMAHERA. These operations complement seizure of the PALAUS by CENTRAL PACIFIC forces.

Phase III Seize areas in the western tip of the VOGELKOP and in HALMAHERA required for flank protection and support of subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO.

cancelled due to no evidence of enemy air activity against Mindanao

Phase IV Occupy MINDANAO and establish bases for the advance to LUZON.

Phase V
Eventual Operations Sever the sea communications between JAPAN and the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area. Reoccupy LUZON, initiate V.L.R. bombing of JAPAN, and establish bases for attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area. *and the Japanese Homeland.*

(3) Sequence and Timing.

The above sequence is based largely upon dispositions and capabilities and is subject to change dependent upon enemy reaction and the measure of success attained in our operations.

Timing is dependent upon availability of means. The campaign may be shortened by expediting the flow of means to the area, particularly amphibious forces.

Flexibility may be attained, to take advantage of enemy weakness, by elimination of objectives or phases.

The timing of operations given below is based upon availability of means as outlined in SEXTANT papers for the SOUTHWEST and SOUTH PACIFIC areas, and the transfer of naval and amphibious forces between the CENTRAL and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas as the operations of the two require.

Phase I - 15 April 1944

Phase II - 15 July 1944

Phase III - 15 September 1944

Phase IV - 5 November 1944

Eventual

Operations - It is estimated that northward movement to secure advanced air bases can be initiated in January, 1945, culminating in assault on LUZON in March.

(4) Major Combat Elements Required.

Minimum estimates of requirements in major units, air groups and amphibious lift are shown in Annex 3 hereto.

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e. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS

- (1) Logistic support is provided from intermediate and advance bases. Task forces establish supply points for support of the local garrisons in newly-occupied areas. Initially, supplies are obtained from bases now established or under construction. As operations progress to the northwestward, ports and supply bases are advanced by corresponding bounds.
- (2) Heavy shipping is employed for concentration of troops from rear areas and for movement of troops to forward areas where facilities are adequate for loading and unloading. Amphibious craft are used for the forward movement from concentration areas of assault elements with accompanying or immediately following equipment and supplies, and for additional troop movements in forward areas where the use of heavy shipping is impracticable. Upon completion of the assault phase, heavy shipping is utilized to advance the supporting elements, service troops, materials and supplies necessary to complete the consolidation and to establish ports and bases.
- (3) As intermediate and advance bases are developed in the forward areas, trans-Pacific shipping is diverted directly thereto in increasing volume, thereby reducing the demand for rehandling and re-shipping from rear areas.
- (4) Bulk petroleum products are transported forward of intermediate bases in small tankers to locations where the tactical situation permits the installation of bulk storage tanks.
- (5) For proposed logistic establishments, see Annex 5.

2. OPERATIONS.

PHASE I

a. TASK.

Advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the HUMBOLDT BAY and the GEELVINK BAY areas the bases required to support subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Advance air and naval bases are required at an intermediate point on the north central coast of NEW GUINEA for the support of operations into western NEW GUINEA and PALAU, and for protection of the lines of communications thereto. Partially developed sites exist in the HUMBOLDT BAY area which may be improved to meet essential requirements.

Bases are required in western NEW GUINEA to support the operations into MINDANAO. Potential areas for these bases are available in GEELVINK BAY, although time factors will require development of a portion of the required installations in the HUMBOLDT BAY area.

Operations to occupy these areas must be covered by the U.S. Pacific Fleet to augment general air support and to prevent interference by hostile fleet elements.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER. (See Annex 2.)

(1) HUMBOLDT BAY, target date 15 April 1944.

An overseas landing operation from NEW GUINEA bases seizes selected objectives in the HUMBOLDT BAY area, by-passing WEWAK and MADANG. Direct air support and convoy cover for this operation are provided by carrier-based elements; general air support from MARKHAM-RAMU VALLEY and VITIAZ STRAIT airdromes.

Advance bases are established in the HUMBOLDT BAY area for support of operations in GEELVINK BAY. Air and light naval bases established make provision for support of Central Pacific operations into PALAU and protection of the line of communications along the north coast of NEW GUINEA. Initial base installations are later augmented as required.

When hostile resistance has sufficiently deteriorated, enemy airdromes initially by-passed are occupied by minor operations.

(2) GEELVINK BAY, target date 1 June 1944.

Anchorage and potential sites for bases in the GEELVINK BAY area are seized by overseas landing operations with airborne support from NEW GUINEA bases. Carrier-based elements provide close cover for convoy movement and support for landing operations. Land-based direct air support is provided from the HUMBOLDT BAY area. General air support, covering hostile installations in western NEW GUINEA, CELEBES and the AMBON area, is provided from northwest AUSTRALIA. It may be supplemented by carrier strikes on HALMAHERA.

The necessary base establishments are promptly developed for support of operations to occupy MINDANAO. Initially they provide forward facilities for the seizure of objectives in the VOGELKOP and HALMAHERA areas.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED. (See Annex 3.)

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault *</u>	<u>GHQ Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
HUMBOLDT BAY - 2 Divs.	2 Divs.	12½ Divs.	
GEELVINK BAY - 1 Div.			
			17½ Divs.

* Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces. **

Assigned elements	5th Air Force
"	13th Air Force
"	RAAF Command
"	7th Fleet

U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements for air operations from Northern SOLOMONS, NEW IRELAND and ADMIRALTY airdromes.

** Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by JCS, to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and to augment land-based general air support with carrier strikes.	As recommended by Commander, ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, SWPA.	1 2/3 Divisions, augmented to 2 Divisions during movement into HUMBOLDT BAY.

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5 b.

PHASE II

a. TASK.

Establish air forces in the ARAFURA SEA area for strategic bombing operations in the N.E.I. and for general support of subsequent operations into the VOGELKOP and HALMAHERA.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Initiation of strategic bombing operations in the eastern N.E.I. prior to availability of very-long-range equipment requires airdromes forward of Northern AUSTRALIA. The concentration of hostile air bases in the BANDA SEA area and development of HALMAHERA as a key area in the hostile defense system require establishment of air bases to the northwest of the ARAFURA SEA for deployment of our air forces to provide general air support for operations westward of NEW GUINEA, and for the development of the VOGELKOP oil field.

These operations, in conjunction with concurrent operations of Central Pacific Forces into the PALAU, deploy our forces and provide the necessary general support for the drive to occupy MINDANAO.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER. (See Annex 2.)

(1) ARAFURA SEA, target date 15 July 1944.

The KAI and TANIMBAR groups are seized by amphibious operations by AUSTRALIAN Forces supported by airborne elements. Direct air support and final convoy cover are provided by carrier-based elements, assisted by land-based air from the DARWIN area. Air protection of the line of communications is provided from HORN ISLAND-MERAUKE-ARNHEM LAND and general air support from the DARWIN area.

Air elements are promptly established for strategic bombing operations in the eastern N.E.I. and for support of operations into the VOGELKOP and HALMAHERA.

(2) RABAU.

When blockade has sufficiently reduced the defensive capacity of the garrison, RABAU is occupied at a date to be determined. Appropriate base facilities are established.

(3) PALAU, optimum target date 15 July 1944.

Central Pacific operations into PALAU from South and Southwest Pacific bases and fleet operations from MANUS ISLAND are supported by maximum employment of facilities to assist in the mounting of the forces and the maintenance of the elements involved. Land-based air support is provided from Northern NEW GUINEA air bases.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED. (See Annex 3.)

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault *</u>	<u>GHQ Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
KAI-TANIMBAR - 3 Divs.	3 Divs.	12 Divs.	
RABAU - 1 Div.			19 Divs.

* Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces. **

Assigned elements	5th Air Force
"	13th Air Force
"	RAAF Command
"	7th Fleet
U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements from Northern SOLOMONS, NEW IRELAND and ADMIRALTY airdromes.	

** Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift.</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by JCS, to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and to augment land-based general air support with carrier strikes.	As recommended by Commander, ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, SWPA.	1 2/3 Divisions

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5 c.

PHASE III

a. TASK.

Seize areas in the western tip of the VOGELKOP and in HAIMAHERA required for flank protection and support of subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO, and for development of the KLAMONO oil field.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Advance into MINDANAO from the line PALAU-GEELVINK BAY KAI-TANIMBAR requires neutralization of the threat to our operations from hostile bases in HAIMAHERA and establishment of the forces necessary for protection of the left flank and support of overseas landing operations into MINDANAO. These requirements can be met by establishing air and light naval bases at the western tip of the VOGELKOP and in the northern HAIMAHERA area. The KLAMONO oil field must be occupied and intensively developed.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER. (See Annex 2.)

(1) HAIMAHERA, target date 15 September 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases in HAIMAHERA are seized or neutralized by an overseas landing operation from NEW GUINEA bases, strongly supported by fleet elements. Direct air support is provided by carrier-based forces, general support from northwest AUSTRALIA, KAI-TANIMBAR and northern NEW GUINEA airdromes. Concurrent operations seize selected objectives at the western tip of the VOGELKOP.

Air and naval elements are established for flank protection and support of subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO.

(2) VOGELKOP, target date 15 September 1944.

The SORONG and KABUI BAY areas, western tip of the VOGELKOP, are occupied by an amphibious operation from NEW GUINEA bases concurrently with operations into HAIMAHERA. Direct air support is provided by carrier-based elements, assisted by land-based elements from the GEELVINK BAY area. General air support is common with that for the HAIMAHERA operation.

Advance air and light naval bases are established for flank protection of operations into MINDANAO. The KLAMONO oil field is intensively developed, initially as a source of bunker fuel; eventually refining facilities will provide higher grade fuels.

(3) (Contingent Operation) AMBON.

In the event that occupation of HALMAHERA and the tip of the VOGELKOP provides inadequate protection from hostile forces in the eastern N.E.I., it may prove necessary to establish air and naval forces in the AMBON area. If required, this operation follows seizure of HALMAHERA-VOGELKOP positions as rapidly as necessary air support can be established. An overseas landing operation through the ARAFURA SEA seizes hostile bases on CERAM and BOEROE ISLANDS and captures AMBON. Direct air support is provided from KAI-TANIMBAR and VOGELKOP bases, close support and convoy cover by carrier-based elements. General air support is provided from the DARWIN area.

Air and naval elements are established in the area as required.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED. (See Annex 3.)

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault *</u>	<u>GHQ Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
HALMAHERA -	2 Divs.	11 Divs.	
3 Divs.			
VOGELKOP -			
1 Div.			17 Divs.

* Including assault force reserves.

Note: - AMBON (Contingent Operation) - 2 additional Australian Divisions.

(2) Air Forces. **

Assigned elements 5th Air Force
 " " 13th Air Force
 " " RAAF Command
 " " 7th Fleet
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based
 elements for operations in the
 BISMARCKS.

** Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by JCS, to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and to augment general air support with carrier strikes.	As recommended by Commander, ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, SWPA.	4 Divisions

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5 d.

PHASE IV

a. TASK.

Occupy MINDANAO and establish bases for the advance into LUZON.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Occupation of MINDANAO requires overseas landing operations on a major scale to seize the necessary beachheads over a wide area to occupy quickly the vital areas of the island. The existing guerrilla organization will provide material support in the operations. Prompt and ample seaborne reinforcements and supply of the initial assault are essential. Air transport on a major scale to supplement seaborne movement becomes feasible upon establishment of adequate staging bases along the line from western NEW GUINEA.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER. (See Annex 2.)

(1) MINDANAO, target date 15 November 1944.

Beachheads in the DAVAO GULF and west central portions of MINDANAO are seized by overseas landing operations with massed carrier-based air support, employing the combined amphibious and naval forces available at that time. Guerrilla forces are employed to seize airdromes and support landing operations. Landing forces in strength seize beachheads in the vicinity of airdromes occupied by guerrilla forces. Initial landings are promptly reinforced and supplied by major seaborne movement, including amphibious lift, and by air transport.

Major bases are promptly developed at DAVAO and DUMANQUILLAS BAY, while air forces are established in the Central Plateau area. Major forces are brought in for the advance to LUZON and for operations to sever JAPANESE communications with the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED. (See Annex 3.)

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault *</u>	<u>GHQ Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
MINDANAO -	2 Divs.	10 Divs.	
5 Divs.			17 Divs.

* Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces. **

Assigned elements 5th Air Force
" " 13th Air Force
" " RAAF Command
" " 7th Fleet
U.S. Naval and Marine land-based
elements for rear-area operations
in the BISMARCKS.

** Including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

Strategic Support

U.S. Fleet, as directed
by JCS, to ensure non-
interference by hostile
fleet elements and to
augment, land-based gen-
eral air support with
carrier strikes.

Direct Support

As recommended
by Commander,
ALLIED NAVAL
FORCES, SWPA.

Amphibious Lift

6 Divisions.

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5 e.

EVENTUAL OPERATIONS
(PHASE V)

a. TASKS.

Sever the sea communications between JAPAN and the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area. Reoccupy LUZON, initiate V.L.R. bombing of JAPAN and establish bases for attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASKS.

Sea communications between JAPAN and the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area will be cut at an early date by air and naval operations from MINDANAO and from advance bases seized in PALAWAN and Northern BORNEO. Reoccupation of LUZON requires amphibious operations along familiar lines to seize initially the Central Plain and MANILA areas. Advanced air fields will be required immediately for topping off V.L.R. bombers which can initiate missions from previously established bases in the south. Extensive bases will be required for the support of the attack into CHINA and FORMOSA.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER. (See Annex 2.)

- (1) Operations from MINDANAO can probably be initiated during January 1945. Advance bases will be secured in PALAWAN and NORTH BORNEO for operations against hostile shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and airdromes in the VISAYAN ISLANDS will be seized for support of operations into LUZON, air and naval support for these movements being provided from MINDANAO bases.

- (2) LUZON.

The advance into LUZON can probably be initiated in March 1945. The scheme of maneuver will depend upon the forces available and the disposition and strength of the enemy at that time. MANILA, the LUZON Plain and the extreme northern portion of LUZON will be the initial objectives.

Major bases are established for the support of the attack into CHINA and FORMOSA. V.L.R. bombing operations are initiated from topping off fields in northern LUZON, while major air bases in LUZON are under development. Naval operations sever JAPANESE shipping routes into the SOUTH CHINA SEA.

d. ESTIMATE OF MEANS. (See Annex 3.)

In view of profound changes in the Pacific situation which are certain to occur prior to the event, it is considered impracticable at this time to estimate forces and logistic establishments required beyond the following general estimate of major units:

5 Divisions (Infantry)
2 Divisions (Airborne)
1 Division (Armored)

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ANNEXES

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1. PHASES OF OPERATIONS.
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 - 3. PHASE III.
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4. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ELEMENTS.
 - A. MAJOR UNITS.
 - B. SUPPORTING ELEMENTS (to follow).
5. LOCATION OF BASES FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
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 - B. PHASE I.
 - C. PHASE II.
 - D. PHASE III.
 - E. PHASE IV.
6. EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES (to follow).

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
ANNEX 2-2

RENO IV

PHASE II

Target Date 15 July

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Objective Area and Assault Elements

15 JULY

Amphibious Operation and Target Date



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ANNEX 2-3

RENO IV

PHASE III


Target Date 15 Sept

Objective Area and Assault Elements

15 SEPT
Amphibious Operation and Target Date

Garrison

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


ANNEX 2-4

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
PHASE IV

Target Date 5 Nov



Objective Area
and
Assault Elements

5 NOV
Amphibious Operation
and
Target Date



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ANNEX 2-5

RENO IV

PHASE V

Eventual Operation



Objective Area



Garrison

SECRET SECURITY

SECRET

MAJOR UNITS

	Assault *	GHQ Res.	Garrison
PHASE I - 15 April - 15 July.	3 Dive. HUMBOLDT BAY - 2 U.S. GEELVINK BAY - 1 U.S. (AB)	2 Dive. 2 - U.S.	12+ Dive. 6 - U.S. 1 - N.Z. 5 1/2 - Aust.
PHASE II - 15 July - 15 Sept.	4 Dive. KAI-TANIMBAR - 3 Aust. RABAU - 1 U.S.	3 Dive. 3 - U.S.	12 Dive. 6 - U.S. 1 - N.Z. 5 - Aust.
PHASE III - 15 Sept. - 5 Nov.	4 Dive. HALMAHERA - 3 U.S. VOGELKOP - 1 U.S.	2 Dive. 1 - U.S. 1 - U.S.(AB)	11 Dive. 5 - U.S. 6 - Aust.
PHASE IV - 5 Nov. - January.	5 Dive. MINDANAO - 5 U.S.	2 Dive. 1 - U.S. 1 - U.S.(AB)	10 Dive. 5 - U.S. 5 - Aust.
PHASE V - (Eventual Operations)	8 Dive. NORTHERN 5-U.S.(INF) PHILIPPINES-2-U.S.(AB) 1-U.S.(ARMD)	2 Dive. 2 - U.S.	11 Dive. 7 - U.S. 4 - Aust.

* Includes Task Force Reserves.

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT *

15 APA	78 LST
7 AKA	76 LCI
18 APD	
7 APA	86 LST **
1 AKA	33 LCI
12 APD	
32 APA	147 LST
10 AKA	155 LCI
18 APD	
60 APA	212 LST
20 AKA	157 LCI
18 APD	
To be determined.	

* Theater requirement.

** Includes RABAU and consolidation along north coast of NEW GUINEA.

AIR FORCES

	5th AF	13th AF	7th Fleet	RAAF & NEI	Total
HB	4	2 1/4			6 1/4
MB	2	1		2	5
L & DB	3			1	4
F(D)	6	2		4	12
F(N)	1/2	1/4			3/4
TC	4 1/2	3/4			5 1/4
Photo-Recco	2	3/4	1 1/4	1 1/4	5 1/4
					38 1/2 Groups

Notes:

- Naval and Marine shore-based air elements of South Pacific Forces will be available for initial air garrison in the BISMARCKS-NORTHERN SOLOMONS area and to provide search and anti-submarine patrol.
- Carrier-based air forces will be required for general and direct support. The amount will vary with the specific requirements of each operation and of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

SECRET

MAJOR UNITS COMBAT DIVISIONS

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES												SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCES										AUSTRALIAN FORCES									
PHASE	OPERATION	1944	43RD	37TH	AMER- CAL	93RD	3RD NZ	* 3RD MAR	40TH	25TH	* 1ST MAR	1ST CAV	24TH	41ST	6TH US	32ND	31ST	33RD	38TH	11TH AB	"X" AB	6TH AUST	7TH AUST	9TH AUST	3RD AUST	5TH AUST	11TH AUST	12TH AUST	4TH AUST	2ND AUST	1ST AUST
I		MARCH	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	KAVIENG		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	HUMBOLDT	APRIL	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	GEELVINK	MAY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
II		JUNE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	ARAFURA	JULY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	RABAU(?)	AUGUST	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
III	HAL MAHERA VOGELKOP	SEPTEMBER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
		OCTOBER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
IV	MINDANAO	NOVEMBER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
		DECEMBER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

* OR REPLACEMENT

ANNEX 4-A

RENO IV

EMPLOYMENT
OF
ELEMENTS

LEGEND

Division 1st CAV

Movement
Outside
Theater

Rehabilitation
and
Training

Movement
in
Theater


Concentration
Area

Assault
and
Combat

Garrison

GHQ
Reserve

SECRET



ANNEX 5(a)

RENO IV

LOCATION OF
BASES FOR
LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE III

LEGEND:

- Army Main Supply Base
- Army Intermediate Supply Base
- Army Advance Supply Base
- + Army Task Force Supply Point
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base
- ⊙ Naval Lion
- ⊙ Naval Cub
- ↓ Minor Naval Facilities
- ∞ Air Depot
- ∞ Advance Air Depot
- ⊙ Supply Base, Australian Army Only

~~SECRET~~ SECURITY



ANNEX 5b
RENO IV
 LOCATION OF BASES
 FOR
 LOGISTIC SUPPORT
 PHASE I

LEGEND

- Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⊙ Naval Lion.
- ⊙ Naval Cub.
- ⊙ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ▨ Objective Area.

SECRET SECURITY



ANNEX 5C

RENO IV

LOCATION OF BASES
FOR LOGISTIC
SUPPORT

PHASE II

LEGEND

- Army Main Supply Base
- Army Intermediate Supply Base
- Army Advance Supply Base
- + Army Task Force Supply Point
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base
- ⚓ Naval Lion
- ⚓ Naval Cub
- ⚓ Minor Naval Facilities
- ▨ Objective Area

~~SECRET SECURITY~~



ANNEX 5d
RENO IV
LOCATION OF BASES
FOR
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
PHASE III

LEGEND

- Army Main Supply Base
- Army Intermediate Supply Base
- Army Advance Supply Base
- Army Task Force Supply Point
- Naval Supply & Heavy Repair Base
- Naval Supply & Light Repair Base
- Naval Lion
- Naval Cub
- Minor Naval Facilities
- Under Const.
- Objective Area

~~SECRET SECURITY~~



ANNEX 56
RENO IV
 LOCATION OF BASES
 FOR
 LOGISTIC SUPPORT
 PHASE IV

LEGEND

- Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⚓ Naval Lion.
- ⚓ Naval Cub.
- ⚓ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ▨ Objective Area.

~~SECRET~~ SECURITY